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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v,

:

ANTHONY HARRIS,

:

Case No. 920139-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Anthony Harris appeals his convictions of
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (1990), and burglary, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This appeal involves a warrantless police entry into
Michael Nichols' apartment no. 4B to seize Dexter Davis. After
Davis was seized, the police conducted a protective sweep of the
apartment and seized defendant.
and defendant was arrested.
1.

Stolen goods were in plain view

The issues raised on appeal are:

Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's

motion to suppress the evidence seized from apartment 4B on the
grounds that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
entry and that reasonable concerns for the officers' safety
permitted the protective sweep?

Whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless
entry and whether a reasonable suspicion of danger supports a
protective sweep are questions of fact. Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.
Ct. 1093, 1095 (1990); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah
App. 1991) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah
1987)).

The trial court's factual findings must be affirmed on

appeal unless clearly erroneous.
2.

Ibid.

Does the state constitution require an officer to

have probable cause to believe that danger to life or limb exists
before the officei: may take protective measures?
Whether a separate state constitutional standard is
applicable is a question of law which is accorded no deference on
appeal.

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-66 (Utah 1990).

When a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for
suppression in the trial court, an appellate court will not
consider that ground for the first time on appeal.

State v.

Schnoor, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (Utah App. 1/7/93); State v.
Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, No.
910218 (Utah 2/5/93).
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendant's motion to sever the Banana Republic charges from the
Mr. Mac charges?
A trial court's denial of a motion to sever will only
be reversed if the refusal is "'a clear abuse of discretion in
that it sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair
trial.'" State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah App.), cert.
2

denied, 843 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Lopez, 789
P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App. 1990)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The full text of any constitutional provisions,
statutes or rules determinative of the outcome of this appeal are
reproduced in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and codefendants Michael Beavers, Michael
Nichols and Terrence Flemmings were charged with burglaries and
thefts at Banana Republic and Mr. Mac (R. 7-8, 23-24) (Addendum
B).

Nichols pled guilty to a third degree felony; Flemmings'

charges were dismissed (R. 29, 897). Defendant and Beavers were
bound over for trial (R. 26-29).
Defendant and Beavers filed motions to suppress (R. 51,
55-56).

After an evidentiary hearing, only Beavers' initial

statement to the police was suppressed; the motions were
otherwise denied (R. 87, 91, 93, 101-08) (Addenda C & D).
Defendant filed a motion to sever his trial from that
of Beavers; the motion was granted (R. 220, 229-33, 234).
Defendant then moved to sever the Banana Republic counts from the
Mr. Mac charges; the motion was denied (R. 234, 530-32) (Addendum
E).
In October, 1991, Beavers was convicted after a jury
trial of misdemeanor theft by receiving, burglary and felony
theft (R. 244-45, 248-49, 352-56,).

Defendant then entered

conditional guilty pleas to second degree theft and third degree
3

burglary; the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 365, 367-73).
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory terms of imprisonment to
run concurrently with a prior prison sentence (R. 396, 398).
Defendant and Beavers timely appealed (R. 384-85, 401). See
State v. Beavers, No. 920056-CA (effectively treated as
consolidated).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
During the early morning of November 12, 1990, a
shopping cart was thrown through the front window of Banana
Republic in Trolley Square (R. 830-31).

The burglars attempted

to take leather coats, but the coats were attached by chains to
the wall and could not be removed (R. 832-33).

Instead, 52

canvass or cloth coats were stolen (R. 834).
Within minutes, defendant, Beavers and Flemmings
knocked on Michael Nichols' apartment door (no. 4B) (R. 804, 830,
889, 1274).

When Nichols opened the door, they brought in

armfuls of coats which they said were stolen from Banana Republic
(R. 890, 917). They "talked about going to some other store" (R.
893).
All four drove to a Mr. Mac store on Fort Union
Boulevard (R. 813, 893-94).

Beavers backed the car up to the

store's front doors and pushed the doors in, breaking the bolt

1

The facts are taken from the evidentiary hearing on the
joint motion to suppress.
When necessary to explain the
substantive offenses, the transcript of Beavers' trial has been
cited. The trial occurred prior to the entry of defendant's pleas
and defendant has cited to the Beavers' transcript in his brief.
4

lock (R. 814, 893-94).

Defendant and Nichols grabbed 39 leather

coats from a wall directly in front of the door (R. 806-08, 894).
When Beavers drove out, he caught the left rear side of the car
on the hanging doors and tore off part of the car's taillight (R.
813-17).

When they returned to Nichols' apartment, the Mr. Mac

coats were hung with the Banana Republic coats (R. 895). Nichols
left for work and the others stayed at the apartment (R. 895-96).
Later that morning, David Hunt, the apartment manager,
heard a loud argument coming from no. 4B (R. 1110-11).

It

"sounded like people were being hit in the apartment, like there
was an assault occurring" (R. 1112).
me" (R. 1110).

Someone said, "Don't kill

Hunt had not seen Nichols all morning, but he

earlier had seen two black males go into the apartment (R. 1111,
1120, 1147).

Hunt was concerned because the night before two

black males had "burglarized or broken into" the apartment and
stolen a television (R. 1111, 1126, 1144).

Hunt "felt one of the

people he had seen [in the morning] was similar to the person the
night before[,] but he wasn't [sic] positive" (R. 1111).

Other

than the two black males, Hunt did not know who was currently in
no. 4B (R. 1120, 1147).
Hunt called the police (R. 1110).

When three officers

responded, he told them that the argument was still going on,
related what he had observed and heard, and gave the police the
description and license number of the car which had dropped off
the two males in the morning (R. 1110-12).
The complex had three floors and no. 4B was in the
5

middle of the second floor (R. 1110).

As the police came up the

stairs, they could hear "male voices arguing inside the
apartment" (R. 1112-13, 1149).

Officer Foster remained in the

stairwell while Officers Humphries and Beger approached no. 4B's
door (R. 1113).

The door was ajar two to three inches; "the

doorjamb and latching mechanism were broken away[,] . . . the jam
being splintered" (R. 1113).

The officers did not know if the

door had been kicked-in the night before in connection with the
television theft or that morning during the assault (R. 1112,
1128, 1152).
Without announcing their presence, the officers stood
on either side of the door (R. 1113, 1134).

In Officer

Humphries' view, "the argument that was occurring was violent
enough in temperament that [he] felt [the officers] should
ascertain as to exactly what was occurring" (R. 1148).

Officers

are trained to assess the nature of a disturbance or domestic
dispute before intervening; otherwise if an officer simply
announces his presence while a violent argument is occurring, the
combatants' reaction may jeopardize the officers' safety (R.
1148-49).
The police listened outside the door for two to four
minutes (R. 1113),

They could hear two males arguing:

The first individual was saying he wanted to
take the coat, show the coat. "I will give
you $10 and I will be back later." The other
voice was objecting to that arrangement, was
saying, "No, you are not leaving with the
coat. I am not going to let you walk with
the coat for $10."

6
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2

He k n e w thai t h e

Officer Humphries testified that when he first observed
Davis he could identify the tags and hanger as Banana Republic's
(R. 1114/ 1131). The court questioned whether the officer could
make this connection during the few seconds he saw Davis before
seizing him; the court voiced that it was more probable that after
the officer entered the apartment and saw the stolen coats, he made
the connection to the Banana Republic burglary which the officer
knew about before coming to the apartment; the prosecutor agreed
(R. 478-80, 5 4 4 ) .
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the court did not dispute
that Officer Humphries saw the tags and hanger and, therefore,
could reasonably discern that the coat was "contraband."
The
officer consistently testified that he could observe store tags and
a store-type hanger (R. 1114, 1117, 1131). He also testified that
based on his undercover experience in fencing operations, it was
his bc*lief that the argument was over stolen coats (R, 11 17, 11 ] 9 ) .
The court did not question this testimony; it only questioned
whether, prior to seizing Davis, the officer could identify the
s o ii r c e o £ t h e s t o J e n c o a t.
7

tenant of no. 4B was a white male, but the only persons he could
see were two black males, later identified as defendant and
Flemmings, and a female black juvenile, Deandra Hurd (R. 1024-25,
1111, 1115-16, 1146-47).

Defendant ran out of view towards the

back of the apartment (R. 1116).

Flemmings began fumbling with a

pile of clothing on the floor (R. 1115-16).

Officer Humphries

called to Officer Foster and the two entered the apartment with
guns drawn as Officer Beger secured Davis on the floor (R. 1119).
Flemmings and Hurd were then ordered to the floor and Humphries
seized defendant (R. 1116).

Officer Humphries quickly made a

cursory check of the rest of the apartment to determine if anyone
else was inside (R. 1120).

In plain view were the stolen coats

(R. 103, 106, 1120-21).3
After providing the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), defendant was
questioned (R. 1047-48, 1053, 1056).

He admitted his involvement

in the Mr. Mac burglary, claimed that he knew about the Banana
Republic stolen coats only after the fact, and implicated Beavers
in both crimes (R. 1049-51, 1068-75).

When questioned the next

day, defendant repeated his confession (R. 1076-77).
At the same time, the police located the Mazda used in
the Mr. Mac burglary behind the apartment.

It was missing a

taillight similar to the one found inside Mr. Mac (R. 798, 82324).

Karen Hull, the car's owner, walked up and explained that
3

A search warrant was subsequently secured; the trial court
found that no property search took place before execution of the
warrant (R. 103, 106, 478-79, 552-53).
8

she had reported the car stolen; she said Beavers had stolen the
k eyb
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Beavers was subsequently arrested.

At Beavers' trial, Nichols testified for the State,
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SUMMARY UF ARGUMENT
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Search and Seizure i s s u e s

The issue raised in thif appeal is whether the
warrantless entry
j us t J tied ,

into apartment

4P t.n seize Dexter Davis w^s

I I tlie police were not lawtuJl\ on I he premises, the
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hand, as defendant

nn I In nl her

conceded below, it the eritiy is valid, I he

subsequent police action at the apartment is constitutionally
perini tisible.
Determination of whether the warrantless entry i nto
apartment 4B is constitutional
ex J s t urnif
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by a r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f t h a t the occupants
9

: * - aia/t.rer*
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presented a danger to the officers or others?
The police were legitimately investigating an assault
in progress when they became aware that the suspected
participants were also engaged in fencing stolen property.

It is

uncontested that the police had a reasonable basis to stop and
question Davis; a closer question is whether they had probable
cause for his arrest.

But whether the police had reasonable

suspicion for a temporary detention or probable cause for a full
arrest is not controlling; for in either case, the police had the
right to seize Davis.

The issue is whether the police could

effectuate that seizure by reaching into the apartment.
The trial court properly found that the exigencies of
the field investigation justified the warrantless entry.

The

apartment had been burglarized the night before; a person
resembling one of the "burglars" had returned in the morning and
was still in the apartment.

Sounds of someone being assaulted

and responding, "Don't kill me," had been reported.
tenant of the apartment had not been seen.

The lawful

The door to the

apartment appeared kicked-in and a loud argument was still
occurring.

These investigations had not been resolved when Davis

stepped through the door, saw the police, reacted by saying, "Oh
shit," and attempted to retreat into the apartment.

The trial

court correctly found that under these circumstances, allowing
Davis to retreat into the apartment created greater danger to
those at the scene.

10

When Davis retreated through the door, the other
occupants became aware of the police and responded: one began
liuiiliJ liny
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apartment and out of police view,
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The trial court properly found

that the officers reasonably viewed these actions ap present: inq a
danger In Iheii safety and, tui lint ludtnii, we,ie justifiMl III
conducting a limited protective sweep of 1 he* premises to secure
ci" lpants .
Defendant argues for the l u s t

I i in*-- on appeal fliniil the

proper standard to judge a protective sweep under the state
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i tin1 utl

II. whittle
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believe that they were in dangei .

s limrl probable cause t.n

Vh,\u JI-I contrary to federal
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Further, since defendant did not challenge the level oi certainty
needed for a protective sweep below, the issue is waived inr
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Severance Issue

Defendant pr^sum*-?
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prosecution.

Resolution of a denial of a severance motion

involves complex considerations of the admissibility of other
crimes evidence and the balancing of any prejudicial impact to
defendant.

For these reasons, appellate review of a denial of

severance cannot properly be undertaken in the context of a
guilty plea but must be viewed in light of trial evidence.
Should this Court nevertheless consider the merits of
defendant's argument, prejudice for purposes of vacating an
otherwise voluntary guilty plea occurs only when a defendant can
establish that but for the ruling of the court, the defendant
would have insisted upon proceeding to trial.

Under this

standard, defendant has failed to establish prejudice.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO APARTMENT 4B WAS
JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT
LEGITIMATE CONCERNS FOR SAFETY PERMITTED A
PROTECTIVE SWEEP; THEREFORE, THE STOLEN
PROPERTY WAS LAWFULLY OBSERVED IN PLAIN VIEW.
The denial of defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence seized from apartment 4B is consistent with established
law.

The warrant requirement of the fourth amendment renders a

warrantless entry and search of a home per se unreasonable, State
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)), and
mandates a warrant to enter a home to effectuate a routine
arrest, Pavton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S. Ct. 1371,
1374-75 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14,
101 S. Ct. 1642, 1648 (1981).

But when the police are faced with
12

exigent circumstances demanding .immediate action, the federal and

Pavton, Steaqald, Ashe, id . ; State v. Larocco, 3 9 1 IE 2d 460 « I ; '0
(Utah 1990).

For this reason, the trial court properly concluded

Thib appeal i Iiallenges the app.1 :i cation ot only one
subcategory of the exigent circumstances doctrine: a warrantless
e n t !"y

i inl i i-1 illi nil

Il n ,sfj" i z e

a per son wh i cf\

i s inec e s s I t a l pel I iy M

risk of injury or harm to other persons present at the scene,
The exception is base rl on a different ratnonaje than in a
wa r r a n 11, e s s s ea r e hi t n ir p r o'pe v f y
Seizure,, § 6 . lf) ( cl ) (1987)

I i, ha Vr\ v e

Search and

In the latter, the exigent

circumstances doctrine permits a warrantless search on the basis
t hat PV" iriencr i* ,i I, I hfc i.lostroyerl
be secured.

,i removeil b e f o r e a v u-u rant ri.in

Larocco, 7 94 P. 2d at 4/0; Ashe, 745 P. 2d at J 258

n.10.
i1

in ni ir
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i at, i oiid 1,1 €" iincJfM J i «-;• t)

I In-' <
, riteiU,

exception to the warrant requirement:
[T|he business of policemen . . . Is to

act,

There is no evidence that defendant. ;,avj a .ecs;r;a; . e
expectation of privacy in apartment 4B sufficient to challenge * - e
warrantless entry. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 14 3 9° S. Ct.
421. 430 (1978); Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct 1684, 1688 (1990).
However,- the trial prosecutor conceded t '.a:. defendant had
"standing" to contest the entry (R. 1096). On appeal, the State is
bound by the prosecutor's factual concessions. Steaqald, 451 U.S.
at 208-09. But see State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880, 887 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (on appeal, State
challenged defendant's expectation of privacy in the searched
premises as an alternative grounds for affirmance; trial prosecutor
had failed to raise the legal argument but had made no factua 1
concession that defendant had p^ expectation of privacy)•
13

not to speculate or meditate on whether [a
report of an emergency] is correct. People
could well die in emergencies if police tried
to act with the calm deliberation associated
with the judicial process.
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(emphasis in original).

Accord State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d

103, 105 (Utah 1980) (officers not only have the right but the
duty to respond to suspicious activity).

For this reason,

M

[t]he need to protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury is justification for
what would be otherwise illegal absent an
exigency or emergency."
Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 393, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978)
(quoting Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212). Accord Provo City v. Warden,
844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992) (adopting "imminent danger to
life or limb" criteria to justify community caretaker automobile
stop).

Recognition that seizures of persons, as opposed to

property, create special risks to law enforcement underlies the
permissibility of all protective police measures. Warden v.
Havden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1646 (1967)
(recognizing "hot pursuit" exception to warrant requirement);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (1968)
(frisks for weapons permissible); State v. Beloard, 840 P.2d 819,
822 (Utah App. 1992) (officer's safety justifies warrantless
entry); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 731-32 (Utah App. 1992)
(weapons search permissible for officer's safety); State v.
Stricklino, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 69, 70-71 (Utah App. 12/3/92)
(weapons search permissible in traffic stop); State v. Carter,
707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985) (pat down during investigative stop
14

permi ssible) .
In this appeal, the question is whether the exigencies
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certainty of criminality dictates the scope oL detention
permissible.

State v. Hicrains, HJi p.2d D, 11 (Utah App. 199 2j
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(citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1325 (1983)).
To temporarily detain a person, the officer must have
objective facts that "would lead a reasonable person to conclude
the subject had committed or was about to commit a crime."
Chapman, 841 P.2d at 727. Accord Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990)
(Addendum A ) .

The facts should not be judged in isolation but

must be considered as a whole.
70.

Stricklina, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at

The officer's experience and training is also a factor.

State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 n.2 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987) .
Here, the officers were called to the scene to
investigate an assault in progress (R. 1110, 1145).

Defendant

characterizes this as only a simple assault, relying on Officer
Humphries' statement that officers were not placed behind the
apartment building because he "was not terribly concerned about
people jumping out the second story over a simple assault" (R.
1145-46).

But this response is not indicative of Officer

Humphries' characterization of the nature of the investigation.
Officer Humphries testified that the argument he overheard was
"violent in temperament" (R. 1148-49).

Because of his concerns

for the nature of the altercation, he posted officers in the
stairwell and on either side of the door as protective measures
(jLd.).

Defendant's assertion that Officer Humphries became

placated when he overheard only a verbal argument is incorrect.
The officer stated that when the verbal argument continued
16
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two years of experience in fencing operations, concluded that the
argument in the apartment concerned fencing (R. 1118-19).
Defendant attempts to discredit the officer's belief by asserting
that the overheard argument was equally consistent with
innocence; this assertion is meritless in light of the
surrounding circumstances.

Accord Stricklinq, 201 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 70; Chapman, 841 P.2d at 728 (innocent explanation for each
fact in isolation is overcome by consideration of totality of
facts to establish reasonable suspicion).

A burglary and theft

had been reported as occurring at the apartment the night before;
one of the suspects was in the apartment and was present during a
reported physical assault; the door was kicked-in; three males
were loudly arguing over a coat which one wanted to take for
$10.00 to "show" and "a lot" of similar coats were in the
apartment (see Statement of Facts at 6-7). Accord State v.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990) (defendant's removal of
item from underneath clothing and placing item in sack while
standing in front of retail store provided reasonable suspicion
of shoplifting).
Defendant admits that the police had reasonable
suspicion to detain Davis outside the apartment, yet
inconsistently claims that the only reason the police seized him
was because he retreated into the apartment.
Officer Humphries' testimony.

This is contrary to

The officer stated that he seized

Davis because of the on-going assault investigation coupled with
the officer's belief that the coat Davis possessed was contraband
18

(R. 1117-18)•

When Davis observed the uniformed officers, said,

"Oh shit," and retreated into the apartment, Officer Humphries
reasonably believed that Davis was attempting to evade the police
because of his present criminal involvement (R. 1115, 1141-42),
The negative verbal response coupled with the immediate retreat
was not ambiguous; rather, it was indicative of Davis'
recognition that he had been "caught,"

While flight alone may

not be an indicator of guilt, flight coupled with "other indicia
of criminality" can establish reasonable suspicion.

Compare

State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990) (alone, the
act of avoiding a roadblock does not establish reasonable
suspicion), with State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1134 n.l (Utah
App. 1991) (flight may be considered with other facts to
determine reasonableness of seizure), and State v. Elliott, 626
P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1981) (flight may elevate reasonable
suspicion to the level of probable cause).
Here, the action of flight coupled with the other
objective facts provided more than reasonable suspicion to detain
Davis; taken as a whole, the facts provided probable cause for
arrest.

Ramirez 814 P.2d at 1134 n.l; Elliot, 626 P.2d at 427.

See also California v. Hodari P., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991);
Sibron (Peters^ v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S. Ct. 1889,
1904) (1968) ("deliberately furtive actions and flight at the
approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens
rea and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are
19

proper factors").

Probable cause exists when

from the facts known to the officer, and the
inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in
his position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense.
Rocha, 600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979).

The officer "need not have

'certain knowledge of the guilt of the suspect.'"

State v.

Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) (citation omitted).
Instead,
[a] valid arrest occurs whenever "a crime
under which the arrest is made and a crime
for which probable cause exists are in some
fashion related. . ."
Id. (citation omitted).
As previously discussed, the trial court did not
articulate if it had found reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to support Davis' seizure.

However, this Court may consider any

alternative grounds for affirmance where the underlying facts are
necessarily established by the record.

State v. Ramirez, 817

P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991); State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313,
1316 (Utah 1986).

Here, the police had reasonable suspicion to

investigate an assault, a residential burglary and fencing or
possession of stolen property.

The first two investigations were

based on Hunt's information and corroboration was obtained when
the police went to the second floor.

They observed the kicked-in

front door which supported a forcible entry in connection with
either the burglary or the assault; they heard the occupants of
the apartment engaged in a loud and "violent" argument; and based
on the officer's experience, he believed the argument was about
20

stolen property.

These observations provided increasing indicia

of criminality.
The officers also knew that the potential suspect in
the burglary was a black male, the missing tenant of the
apartment was a white male, and the assault and arguments began
only after the black males had returned to the apartment in the
morning (see Statement of Facts at 5).

The police then observed

Davis, a black male, exit the apartment.

He was wearing a coat

and carried what appeared to be a stolen coat on a hanger.

When

he saw the police, he made a negative exclamation and attempted
to retreat.

In light of these circumstances, a reasonable and

prudent officer would be justified in believing that Davis was
involved in theft by receiving.

Accord State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d

902, 904 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990);
State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah 1985) (a defendant may
be convicted of theft by receiving even if the property is not in
fact stolen if the defendant acted under the belief that the
property was stolen).

It was not necessary for the police to

verify the source of the suspected stolen property before acting.
Morck, 821 P.2d at 1193 (probable cause only requires the
"probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal
activity") (citation omitted); Rocha, 600 P.2d at 545 (arrest
standard does not require an Habsolutely certain judgment" before
the police act).
Finally, a basis existed to detain Davis apart from his
possession of contraband: Davis was present in the apartment when
21

the assault was reported to have occurred and during the ensuing
argument over stolen property.
"Where a crime may have been committed and a
suspect or important witness is about to
disappear, it seems irrational to deprive the
officer of the opportunity to 'freeze' the
situation for a short time, so that he may
make inquiry and arrive at a considered
judgment about further action to be taken*
To deny the police such a power would be to
pay a high price in effective policing and in
the police's respect for the good sense of
the rules that govern them."
Watkins v. State, 420 A.2d 270, 274 (Md. App. 1980) (quoting ALI,
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2 at 272). Until
the officers could determine the whereabouts of the lawful tenant
and/or the safety of the occupants, they had the duty to "freeze"
the situation by preventing witnesses or suspects from leaving
the scene.
B. The De Minimis Entry into the Apartment
to Seize Davis Was Justified by Exigent
Circumstances.
Having implicitly found a lawful basis for the seizure,
the trial court ruled that: (1) reaching into the apartment to
grab Davis was an entry; and (2) the entry was justified by the
dangerousness of the situation (R. 102, 105, 551) (Addendum D ) .
While dispute exists, the better view is that whether
an entry has occurred is controlled by the location of the person
seized and not the location of the officer.
Seizure. § 6.1(e).

LaFave, Search and

An overly analytical approach is, however,

disfavored; fourth amendment issues should not be determined by
"metaphysical subtleties."

Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740,
22

89 S. Ct. 1420, 1425 (1969).

Instead, where an officer "merely

reaches in to manifest the fact of arrest, such a de minimus
breaking of the vertical plane above the threshold should not
itself make the warrantless arrest unlawful; otherwise the
legality of doorway arrests would have to be determined by resort
to plum bob and quaint distinctions drawn from the 'entry'
ingredient of common law burglary,"
§ 6.1(5) at 590-91.

LaFave, Search and Seizure,

But see Pavton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct.

at 1382 ("The fourth amendment has drawn a firm line at the
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.").
For purposes of argument, the State assumes a de minimis

entry

was made when the officer reached in and seized Davis.
Defendant asserts that unless the entry was supported
by probable cause to arrest, the exigent circumstances doctrine
is inapplicable.

Defendant, further, argues that even if the

doctrine is applicable, no exigencies existed.

Both contentions

are incorrect.
1. Applicability of the Exigent Circumstances Doctrine.
The exigent circumstances doctrine is traditionally
predicated on probable cause in the sense that a warrantless
search may occur where there is probable cause to believe that
the place searched contains the object of the search and exigent
circumstances justify the failure to obtain a warrant.
794 P.2d at 467-68.

Larocco,

Similarly, if there is probable cause to

arrest, the police may make a warrantless entry to effectuate the
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arrest where exigent circumstances exist which would eliminate
the reasonable opportunity to secure a warrant without creating
danger to the police or others.

United States v. Santana, 427

U.S. 43, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409 (1976); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d
at, 1134.

The doctrine, however, does not mandate that the

officers have probable cause to arrest plus probable cause to
search plus exigent circumstances before acting; yet, this is
what defendant effectively argues.
The warrant requirement is founded on the premise that
a person's home should be "free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."

Pavton, 455 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at 1382.

"Differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and
entries to arrest are merely ones of degree rather than kind.
The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic; the
breach of the entrance to an individual's home."

id. at 589, at

1381.
However, while an arrest warrant and a search
warrant both serve to subject the probablecause determination of the police to judicial
review, the interests protected by the two
warrants differ. An arrest warrant is issued
by a magistrate upon a showing that probable
cause exists to believe that the subject of
the warrant has committed an offense and thus
the warrant primarily serves to protect an
individual from an unreasonable seizure. A
search warrant, in contrast, is issued upon a
showing of probable cause to believe that the
legitimate object of a search is located in a
particular place, and therefore safeguards an
individual's interest in the privacy of his
home and possessions against the unjustified
intrusion of the police.
Steaqald, 451 U.S. at 212-213, 101 S. Ct. at 1648.
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Davis was seized in a third-party's home, therefore,
the constitutional interests to be protected are: (1) Davis'
right to be protected against an unreasonable seizure regardless
of the location; and (2) the "homeowner's"6 right to be
protected against an unreasonable intrusion.
Turning to Davis' interest, the constitution does not
protect what is exposed to public view: by carrying the stolen
coat into the public hallway, Davis diminished any expectation of
privacy in protecting observations of himself or his possessions.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, 88 S. Ct. at 516; State v. Lee, 633 P.2d
48, 51 (Utah 1981).

Where the police have a lawful basis to

seize a person, that person cannot evade the seizure by
retreating inside a home.

Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43, 96 U.S. at

2409-10 (recognizing "hot pursuit" doctrine); Ramirez, 814 P.2d
at 1135 (exigent circumstances justify seizure of misdemeanant in
home); State v. Hamilton, 710 P.2d 174, 175 (Utah 1985) ("hot
pursuit" doctrine applicable to traffic offense of failing to
yield the right of way).

A defendant "cannot reduce a legitimate

arrest attempt to a game of 'tag' by reaching 'home' a few steps
ahead of the police."

Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1135.

The cases cited are typical of the majority of exigent
circumstance seizure cases: either the trial court found probable
cause for the seizure or the appellate courts elevate the trial

6

Homeowner is used to connote anyone with an expectation of
privacy in the premises sufficient to challenge the entry. The
trial prosecutor conceded that defendant had an expectation of
privacy in the home. See footnote 4.
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court's finding of reasonable suspicion to probable cause based
on the defendant's flight from the attempted stop*
Edwards v. United States (Edwards I).

Compare

364 A.2d 1209, 1214 (D.C.

App, 1976) (in effectuating a Terry stop, police may follow
fleeing suspect into home), with Edwards v. United States
(Edwards m ,

379 A.2d 976, 978 (D.C. App. 1979) (rehearing en

banc) (facts support probable cause for arrest; no discussion of
validity of original panel decision that entry was permissible to
effectuate Terry detention).

See also Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1135

n.3 (finding probable cause for arrest and noting that court was
not deciding if a home entry could be predicated on reasonable
suspicion); State v. Flowers, 789 P.2d 333, 338 (Wash. App. 1990)
(commenting that court need not decide if police actions were
also justified on reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances
since court found probable cause to arrest).
The few jurisdictions that have directly addressed the
issue have concluded that an warrantless entry for the purpose of
effectuating a level two seizure is not per se unreasonable if
otherwise justified by exigent circumstances.

People v. Rivera,

598 N.E.2d 423, 427 (111. App. 1992); United States v. Pace, 898
F.2d 1218, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, Cialoni v.
U.S., 110 S. Ct. 3286 (1990); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 421 A.2d
721, 724-25 (Penn. Super. 1980). See also Oregon v. Davis, 666
P.2d 802, 812 (Oregon 1983) (finding no exigent circumstances to
justify entry but recognizing that doctrine may permit an entry
supported by less than probable cause).
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Implicit in these decisions is the recognition that
since the fourth amendment permits an officer to follow a fleeing
arrestee into a home to effectuate an arrest, Santana, 427 U.S.
at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 2410, there is no logical reason for a
different result simply because the basis for the seizure is
predicated on reasonable suspicion.
§ 9.2(d) at 369-70.

LaFave, Search and Seizure,

The level of "reasonableness" to support the

seizure will dictate the length and scope of detention, but it is
the probable cause to believe that the suspect is in the place to
be searched which supports the entry.

Compare Pavton, 445 U.S.

at 589-91, 100 S. Ct. at 1381-83, with Steaaald, 451 U.S. at 212215, 101 S. Ct. at 1647-49.

For this reason, the police do not

need to simply walk away from an incomplete Terry stop but may
follow the fleeing suspect into a private home under the same
limited circumstances that they may follow a fleeing arrestee.
Edwards I, 364 A.2d at 1214 (reasoning cited with approval by
LaFave, .id.)*

Just as Santana, Pavton, and Steaqald limit

entries made for purposes of arrest,
the police, in certain limited circumstances,
may be authorized to make a warrantless entry
into a private premises for the purpose of
effectuating a Terry stop provided the police
have a lawful basis to stop a suspect in a
public place and the suspect reacts by
suddenly fleeing to a private sanctuary,
thereby thwarting any opportunity to conduct
the detention at a public place.
Rivera, 598 N.E.2d at 427. Accord Pace, 898 F.2d at 1228-29
(distinguishing Pavton on grounds that it involved only a routine
arrest and applying exigent circumstances doctrine to justify
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entry into private garage to effectuate a temporary detention);
Daniels, 421 A.2d at 724-25 (recognizing "intermediate response"
permitting an exigent warrantless entry for the limited purpose
of questioning occupants pursuant to Terry where no probable
cause for arrest).

See also Servis v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d

156, 162 (Va. App. 1988) (permitting officers to take protective
actions when making Terry type seizures in a home on the basis
the "dangerousness" of a suspect remains the same whether
arrested or temporarily seized and no matter on which "side of
the threshold the defendant is standing") (citations omitted).
Similarly, the "homeowner's" constitutional interest
was not affected by whether the police had reasonable suspicion
or probable cause for Davis' seizure.

For even if the police had

an arrest warrant for Davis, they could not have entered Nichols'
apartment without a search warrant absent exigent circumstances.
Steaaald, 451 U.S. at 213 101 S. Ct. at 1648.

It is the probable

cause to believe that the object of the search is in the thirdparty home which protects the homeowner from impermissible
generalized searches. JEd.. at 215, at 1649. Here, the police had
probable cause to believe that Davis was in the home; he was
standing right at the door.

Thus, this case is most similar to

"hot pursuit" cases, which since common law have permitted
forcible entries into homes to effectuate the seizure of a
fleeing suspect. .Id. at 218-19, at 1651. Accord Ramirez, 814
P.2d at 1134.
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2.

Existence of Exigent Circumstances.

Whether exigent circumstances exist is question of
fact: Under the totality of the circumstances, would the
procurement of a warrant have jeopardized the safety of the
officers or others at the scene?
745 P.2d at 1258.

Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470; Ashe,

Judicial hindsight is not the test; rather,

consideration must be given for the officer's reasonable concerns
for safety and the spilt-second nature of their decisions during
evolving field investigations.

Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1136.

Factors generally considered are: (1) the nature of the
offense under investigation, including whether it is a violent
offense; (2) reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed or
dangerous; (3) the trustworthiness of the information that the
suspect has or is committing an offense; (4) the strength of the
belief that the suspect is on the premises; (5) the likelihood of
the suspect escaping if not quickly apprehended; and (6) the
nature of the entry made.

Flowers, 789 P.2d 338 (citing Dorman

v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).

Other relevant

factors are: (7) whether the officers were in hot pursuit of a
fleeing suspect; and (8) whether the seizure was planned or
unplanned.

Flowers, id. (citations omitted).

See also LaFave,

Search and Seizure, § 6.1(f) at 598-601.
The trial court found that the officers were faced with
a "very dangerous scenario" (R. 647). The police had received
"very certain information" that the apartment had been broken
into the night before and that an assault was now "in progress";
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a person inside the apartment had said, "Don't kill me," and the
apartment's front door was broken and appeared kicked-in (R. 102,
647).

When Davis retreated into the apartment, the court found

that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that he was getting
a weapon or getting the remaining occupants to resist the police
(R. 105, 647). As such, the court concluded that Davis'
immediate seizure was "a safety measure for the police" (R. 105).
The trial court's findings are fully supported by the
record and, therefore, must be given deference on appeal. Morck,
821 P.2d at 1192; Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. Additionally, this
Court may consider any alternative basis to support the court's
ruling in light of the uncontroverted evidence presented below.
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6 (appellate court may
find facts to support judgment where there is competent and
reasonable evidence to do so).

The facts to support the trial

court's finding of exigency are:
1. The assault investigation was still
ongoing and the police had not located the
lawful occupant of the apartment, a white
male. The police knew that at least 3 males
were in the apartment, any one of which could
be the assault victim, a potential hostage,
or a criminal compatriot.
2. The crimes being investigated assault,
burglary of the apartment, and fencing all
were crimes for which the police could
reasonably conclude the participants were
violent. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660 (burglary
is a crime of violence). This was supported
by Hunt's report of hearing people struck and
the officers' observations of the forcibly
broken front door and the loud continuing
argument in the apartment.
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3. The apartment was on the second floor in a
multiple apartment complex. It was ten
o'clock in the morning on Veteran's Day when
it could be assumed that many of the other
apartments were occupied (R. 1144). If the
occupants of the apartment decided to
barricade themselves, the police would not be
able to isolate the confrontation.
4. When Davis exited the apartment, he was
aware of the officers' presence and attempted
to flee. His action of fleeing alerted the
other occupants to the police presence.
5. The basis of any information to support
criminality was either from Hunt, a private
citizen, or based on the officers' personal
observations.
6. The police had certain information that
Davis was on the premises because they could
observe him.
7. Because it was Veteran's Day, it took over
4 hours to subsequently secure a search
warrant.
8. The entry made was de minimis; the door
was already open and the officer reached in
to seize Davis while still standing outside
the door.
9. The officers never planned to seize anyone
when they first responded to the assault
call. Their investigation escalated while on
the scene.
Based on the facts of this case, the officer's warrantless entry
to seize Davis was justified*
C. Since the Police Were Lawfully in the
Apartment, They Had the Right to Conduct a
Protective Sweep.
The trial court found that once Davis was seized, the
police were lawfully in the apartment and had the right to
conduct a protective sweep for their safety (R. 102-03, 105,
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552).

As the court recognized, a protective sweep must be

limited to a brief inspection of the premises solely for the
purpose of securing other persons on the premises. Maryland v.
Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1099.

It is not a full search and no areas

which could not secrete a person may be inspected.

.Id. Here,

the court found that the police did not conduct a full search,
did not open drawers or other impermissible areas, and limited
their inspection in time and purpose to the detainment of
persons; for these reasons, the sweep was permissible (R. 103,
105, 552) (Addenda C & D ) .
While Buie was based on a warrant-authorized entry, the
holding regarding protective sweeps is predicated on the concept
of any lawful entry.

If the police enter lawfully, whether by

warrant, by consent, or under the exigent circumstances doctrine,
the determinative factor is their reasonable need to protect
themselves while making that lawful entry.

State v. Kelly, 718

P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986) (protective sweep permissible where
police are leaving home following warrantless arrest); Rocha, 600
P.2d at 546 (protective sweep reasonably following "hot pursuit"
and seizure of suspect just inside back door).

Nor is the

permissibility of a protective sweep contingent on an entry
having been made.

United States v. Soria, 959 F.2d 855, 857

(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 236 (1992) (arrest made
outside but protective sweep of premises permissible); United
States v. Hovos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1397 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied. 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990) (protective sweep permissible
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following warrantless arrest outside premises); United States v.
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977) (if reasonable fear
of safety, protective sweep allowed regardless of location of
arrestee); People v. Febus, 566 N.Y.Supp.2d 1000, 1002 (N.Y. App.
1990), cert, denied, 567 N.Y.Supp.2d 203 (1991) (where seizure
made just outside partially opened door, fear of safety permitted
police to fully open door and seize persons in view).

But see

Haves v. State, 797 P.2d 962, 965-68 (Nev. 1990) (in a split
decision, court adopts Buie as state constitutional standard but
finds no reasonable suspicion to support protective sweep where
arrest occurred outside home).

Since the permissibility of the

sweep is driven by the reasonableness of the concern for safety,
there is no policy reason to permit a protective sweep when the
entry is made by warrant, but refuse to permit sweeps when the
entry is lawfully made otherwise.
Here, the officers were confronted with a dangerous
situation.

This danger escalated when the police attempted to

seize Davis.

The police could see three other occupants in the

apartment, none of which were the lawful tenant, and all of whom
were aware of the police presence.

Flemmings' action of

reaching into a pile of clothing and defendant's action of
running farther into the apartment could reasonably support a
belief that they were attempting to secure weapons or prepare to
resist the police presence. Additionally, in light of the
reported assault and the failure to observe the white male
occupant, the police could reasonably assume the occupant had
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been injured but was still on the premises.

Based on these

reasonable concerns for safety, the protective sweep was
permissible.
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM HE NOW ASSERTS;
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A RATIONALE
FOR APPLYING A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD TO A
PROTECTIVE SWEEP.
The hearing on defendant and Beavers' motions to
suppress was held jointly prior to the severance of their trials
(R. 87, 91, 93a). Both defendants generally asserted that the
entry into apartment 4B was in violation of the state and federal
constitutions; Beavers separately asserted that his seizure in
the Buzzard home was in violation of both constitutions (R. 463506).

Neither defendant filed a written memorandum in support of

their state constitutional argument.

Instead, defendant supplied

the court with copies of two law journal articles7 supporting
separate state constitutional analysis and then argued that
historically the Utah constitution imposed a "higher" standard
and "greater protection" than the federal constitution (R. 467).
The court stated that while it thought a higher state standard
could be applicable in some contexts, under either the state or
federal constitution, the issue here was one of fundamental
reasonableness (R. 468).
7

While the record does not specifically identify the
articles, one apparently was Wallentine, Heeding the Call:
Search

and Seizure

Jurisprudence

Under the Utah Constitution,

Article

I,

Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 267 (1991); the other was only
identified as from the William and Mary Law Review.
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Under these circumstances, defendant has failed to
preserve a state constitutional question.

Since 1986, the Utah

Supreme Court has made clear that appellants who wish to raise
state constitutional claims must do so with specific analysis.
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986).

This Court has

been equally clear by refusing to consider state constitutional
arguments which have not been preserved below nor properly
analyzed on appeal.

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d. 1268, 1272 (Utah

App. 1990) ("proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and
probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation is before
the trial court").

Accord State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 462 n.l

(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993)
(appellant must offer rationale to diverge from federal
analysis); State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 (Utah 1991) (where
appellant fails to offer a basis for independent reliance on
state constitution, appellate court will only consider federal
analysis).
Defendant's failure to properly advance and, therefore,
preserve a separate state constitutional claim can best be seen
by an analysis of his argument below.

As noted, defendant

asserted on the basis of two articles that Utah was historically
concerned with illegal searches and seizures because of the
religious persecution of their church leaders.

But as defendant

admitted, these concerns arose because law enforcement officers
"would ignore what were at the time traditional Fourth Amendment
protections" (R. 469) (emphasis added).
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The fact that federal

constitutional protections were not being enforced does not
provide a historical justification for expansion of state
constitutional protections.

In commenting on the weakness of a

historical argument to support separate analysis of article I, §
14 of the Utah Constitution, Professor Paul Cassell states that
Utah's history establishes that the state constitutional framers'
fears were not with the scope of the federal amendment governing
search and seizure but with the harsh federal criminal
prosecutions which followed.

Constitution
of Utah's

Seriously:
Exclusionary

August, 1993 ). 8

Paul G. Cassell, Taking

the

Utah

An Examination of the Mysterious
Rule,

Creation

1993 Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming

Wanting to prevent the abuses of the polygamy

prosecutions, the framers invoked more protective language in
article I, § 4, the freedom of religion provision of the state
constitution, than found in the federal constitution.

This

concern, however, did not cross-over to article I, § 14, the
search and seizure provision, which was adopted with the
identical language of the federal provision.

Id.

Below, defendant's legal arguments advocated no
different approach than existing fourth amendment law.

Defendant

argued that a warrant is constitutionally required to enter a
home to make a routine arrest.

This is beyond dispute.

Payton,

455 U.S. at 576 100 S. Ct. at 1375; Steaqald, 451 U.S. at 211,
8

A complete copy of this article is in the University of Utah
College of Law library. Addendum F of this brief contains a copy
of that portion of the article which criticizes Kenneth
Wallentine's historical approach in the context of article I, § 14
of the Utah Constitution.
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101 S. Ct. at 1649; Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255.

Defendant asserted that

pretextual police conduct which induces an exigency must be
disregarded.

Existing fourth amendment law so requires.

See

LaFave, Search and Seizure, S 6.5(b) at 662. Finally, while
facially asserting that the state constitution provides "greater
protection,•• defendant advocated adoption of federal exigent
circumstances case law (R. 482-83).
Below, defendant argued that the facts did not support
a protective sweep, arguing that under Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093,
there was no basis from which to find that the occupants
endangered the safety of the officers.

On appeal, defendant now

asserts that the state constitution requires a departure from the
federal standard governing protective sweeps.

For the first

time, defendant challenges the federal reasonable suspicion
standard and advocates that protective sweeps be permitted only
where the officers have probable cause to believe their safety is
endangered.

Because defendant never raised this issue below, he

has failed to preserve it for purposes of appeal.

State v.

Schnoor, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (Utah App. 1/7/93).
Even if this Court were to consider the merits of
defendant's argument, he has failed to establish a need to depart
from the federal standards governing protective sweeps.

See

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1991) (separate state
constitutional standard necessary where federal standard is
neither legally nor factually supportable); Larocco, 794 P.2d at
466 (plurality of supreme court asserting that separate state
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constitutional standard is appropriate to return to original
federal standard which had become confused by ensuing federal
case law); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 149 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, granted, No. 910218 (Utah 2/5/93) (state constitution
mandates legislative authorization for suspicionless
investigatory roadblocks; clarifies federal standard requiring
"politically accountable" guidelines).

Accord State v. Watts,

750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (state and federal
constitutional search and seizure provisions are nearly verbatim
and should be construed similarly except possibility to protect
state constitutional law from the "vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given the fourth amendment by federal courts").
Here, defendant has not established that federal law governing
protective sweeps is so inconsistent or confusing so as to
justify departure from the clear federal standard.
Contrary to defendant's assertions, Buie/s holding
neither modified nor diverged from pre-existing federal law.

As

discussed in Point 1(C), to conduct a protective sweep, the
police must first establish a lawful presence and purpose whether
by procurement of a warrant or consent or by the existence of
exigent circumstances.

Only then, will a limited protective

sweep be allowed to protect the officers' safety in conducting
their lawful business. All Buie did was make clear the standard
governing the determination of dangerousness. Accord Rocha, 600
P.2d at 545-46 (approving of pre-Buie protective sweep based on
reasonable suspicion that additional persons were on premises and
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armed and that evidence would be destroyed); Kelly, 718 P.2d at
391 (approving of pre-Buie protective sweep as proper security
measure).
Further, if the police needed probable cause to believe
their safety was in danger before conducting protective measures,
the safety exception would be nullified.

Defendant's position is

contrary to long-standing judicial recognition of the need for
officers to take reasonable means to protect themselves while
conducting lawful searches and seizures.

See Point I at 14.

POINT III
DEFENDANT CANNOT CHALLENGE A DENIAL OF A
MOTION TO SEVER THROUGH ENTRY OF A
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA; EVEN IF THE MERITS
ARE CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION.
Pretrial, defendant moved to sever his trial from that
of Beavers; the motion was granted (R. 220, 229-33, 235, 430).
Defendant then moved to sever the Banana Republic burglary and
theft charges from the Mr. Mac charges, charges joined in a
single information (R. 8, 23, 24, 432). The State argued that
the joinder was proper and that judicial economy would not be
served by severing the counts since the evidence and witnesses
were essentially the same (R. 442-43).

The court balanced these

factors against defendant's allegation of prejudice, and
concluded that
the evidence is so intertwined — the
closeness in time of the two incidents and
the fact that all of the evidence for both
the crimes was found at the same time — the
evidence being so intertwined and of the same
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identity as to make it, as a practical
matter, almost impossible to separate it out
anyway. I just don't think that this
particular situation is so prejudicial to the
defendants that it outweighs the need to get
the case tried in an efficient manner.
(R. 453). The motion was denied (R. 236-36A) (Addendum E).
Subsequently, Beavers was convicted after a jury trial (R. 22449, 352-63).

Defendant then entered conditional guilty pleas to

the burglary and theft of property from Banana Republic (Counts I
and II); under the plea bargain, the Mr. Mac charges were
dismissed (Counts III and IV) (R. 365, 367-368).9
A. A Challenge to a Denial of a Motion to
Sever Cannot Properly Be Preserved Through
Use of a Conditional Guilty Plea.
There is no question that defendant intended to enter
conditional guilty pleas and then appeal the severance denial;
however, the use of such pleas to raise issues outside the
context of pretrial motions to suppress evidence is improper.10
While the Utah Supreme Court has never endorsed the use
of conditional pleas, this Court recognized their validity in
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah App. 1988).

But Sery

9

A defendant must affirmatively establish that the prosecutor
and court agreed to the entry of a conditional plea. State v.
Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988).
Here, there is no
transcript of the entry of the pleas and the judgment and
commitment orders do not indicate that the pleas are conditional
(R. 396-99). However, an unsigned minute entry indicates that the
pleas were conditional and defendant's affidavit in support of his
plea refers to the conditional nature of the pleas (R. 365, 367).
10

Much of the present argument is taken from the State briefs
in State v. Donald H. Keitz, No. 920558-CA, and State v. Eugene
Montova, No. 920441-CA; these pending cases challenge the use of
Serv pleas outside the fourth amendment context.
40

only recognized the appropriateness of such pleas to preserve
challenges to pretrial motions to suppress evidence since the
only issue was whether the State should be "barred from being
able to prove its case because of the illegal seizure of
evidence."

Id., at 939. Appellate review of this procedural

question could legitimately be undertaken without regard to the
defendant's factual guilt and conserves judicial resources by
efficiently resolving the issue which would ultimately terminate
future proceedings.

If the trial court's denial of the motion to

suppress was affirmed on appeal, defendant's otherwise voluntary
plea would stand.

If the ruling on the motion to suppress was

reversed, the prosecutor was prohibited from proceeding with the
challenged evidence and further prosecution would be barred.
Serv not only limited conditional pleas to cases which
"ultimately hinged" on the admissibility of the challenged
evidence but relied as authority on cases which expressly limited
conditional pleas to such circumstances.

!£. at 938.

The problems inherent in expanding the use of
conditional pleas beyond the fourth amendment context is
exemplified by this case.

Here, the issue is whether the trial

court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to
sever the Mr. Mac and Banana Republic charges.11
11

Before

To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court's
determination must be "beyond the limits of reasonability." State
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). An appellate court
must "presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly
exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). Accord State v.
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1/7/93).
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reversal would be warranted, defendant must establish not only
that joinder was improper but that the refusal to sever
sacrificed his "right to a fundamentally fair trial."

State v.

Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992) (citing State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App.
1990), and State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977),
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219 (1978)).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (Supp. 1992) permits
offenses to be joined if they are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are
otherwise connected together in their
commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a
common scheme or plan.
If the trial court finds that a party is prejudiced by the
joinder permitted under subsection (1), subsection (4) directs
that severance be granted. (See Addendum A for text of any rule
or statute cited).

In making this latter determination, a trial

court may consider whether evidence of both offenses would be
admissible pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, in
separate trials if no joinder was permitted.
118-19.

Lee, 831 P.2d at

In turn, a rule 404(b) determination requires the trial

court to consider the tendency of the challenged evidence to
unfairly prejudice a defendant by determining if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
(citing rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence).

The balancing

requirement is fact-intensive, involving considerations of
the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime, the
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Id.

similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the interval of time that has elapsed between
the crimes, the need for the evidence, the
efficacy of alternative proof and the degree
to which the evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).
To obtain a reversal of a conviction arising from a
trial in which severance was denied, a defendant must establish
that the failure to sever resulted in a denial of due process,
that his right to a fair trial was impaired.

State v. Velarde,

734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986); Lee, 831 P.2d at 117. Thus, even
where joinder is permissible, denial of a motion may still be
erroneous if a defendant establishes that but for the admission
of the other crimes evidence, there is "a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result."

Velarde, 734 P.2d at 445 n.10 (no

error where evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial).

On

the other hand, where a misjoinder occurs as a matter of law,
admission of the other crimes evidence will be presumed
prejudicial and reversal mandated unless

the admission of the

evidence is otherwise permissible. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d
738, 741-42 (Utah 1985) (due process violation found where
admission of otherwise inadmissible prior crimes evidence
permitted the jury to infer the defendant's guilt based on his
criminal history and disposition); State v. Gotfrev, 598 P.2d
1235, 1238 (Utah 1979) (where appellate court cannot conclude
that misjoinder did not effect outcome of the trial, reversible
is appropriate).
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Appellate review of a denial of a severance motion,
therefore, involves more than interpretation and application a
procedural statute, i.e., are the joined offenses part of a
"common plan or scheme."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l).

It also

requires review of the trial court's assessment of overall
prejudice, including the court's balancing of the prejudicial
impact of the evidence with its probative value.
403; Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4).

Utah R. Evid.

While appellate review of

these factors is governed by the reasonableness of the lower
court's exercise of its discretion, it is also governed by the
impact of the denial of the motion to sever on the ultimate factfinder's determination of guilt.

The latter function can only be

undertaken in light of the totality of the evidence presented to
support the conviction and a consideration of any permissible use
of the other crimes evidence.
Proper analysis of a denial of a motion to sever cannot
be undertaken on the basis of a conditional guilty plea.

A

pretrial record does not provide an adequate evidentiary record
to judge the impact of the trial court's ruling on defendant's
right to a fair trial.

For even assuming the offenses were

misjoined, this Court can only speculate as to the impact of that
error on the outcome of a future trial.

In the guilty plea

context, prejudice cannot be assessed by applying the traditional
test of whether "but for the substantial error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a different result," for the only result
supportable by the record is that defendant chose to voluntarily
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enter a guilty plea.

Instead, a modification of the prejudice

prong is applicable.

To establish prejudice in the context of a

guilty plea, a defendant must establish that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the substantial error, he
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on proceeding
to trial.

C£. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)

(recognizing this modified test for prejudice in ineffectiveness
of counsel claims arising in the context of guilty pleas).
A conditional plea which preserves a severance denial
amounts to the metaphysical assertion that the defendant is
guilty but if he had proceeded to trial, he would have
necessarily been deprived of due process.

This is fundamentally

different from a plea preserving a pretrial suppression issue,
where the defendant asserts he is guilty but the prosecution is
barred.

Serv, 758 P.2d at 939.

For these reasons, this Court

should prospectively restrict the scope of conditional pleas by
recognizing their application only to the preservation of
pretrial motions to suppress evidence.

Since defendant entered

the conditional pleas with the understanding that any pretrial
issue could be raised on appeal, defendant should be allowed to
withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. Accord State v.
Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983) (where prosecutor
erroneously agreed to entry of a conditional plea, the defendant
was permitted to withdraw it).

Alternatively, defendant may

dismiss his severance challenge on appeal and proceed solely on
his evidentiary suppression issues.
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B. The Trial Court Properly Concluded the
Banana Republic and Mr. Mac Burglaries Were
So Factually Intermixed that Their Joinder
was Permissible and Would Not Result in Undue
Prejudice to Defendant.
Even if this Court considers defendant's substantive
argument, defendant has not established that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever.
On appeal, defendant attacks the court's ruling on
three grounds: (1) that State v. Lee, 831 P.2d at 116 was
incorrect in concluding that rule 9 was repealed by Utah Code
Ann. § 77-8a-l; (2) that Lee incorrectly defined "common scheme
or plan"; and (3) that the admission of evidence of both
burglaries and thefts would have caused a jury to view defendant
as a "bad person"
1. Section 77-8a-l Governs Joinder and
Severance.
In State v. Lee, this Court considered the identical
argument defendant now makes concerning section 77-8a-l, that is
that the legislature did not properly amend or repeal rule 9 in
passing the statute and therefore, rule 9 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure still controls joinder and severance. (See
Addendum A for the text of statute and rule.)

Defendant has

advanced no argument or case authority not considered in Lee.
This Court should summarily reject defendant's argument and reaffirm that the plain language of the legislative enactment
expresses the legislature's intent to repeal rule 9.
P.2d at 116.
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Lee, 831

2. The Definition of "Common Scheme or Plan"
as Used in Section 77-8a-l Encompasses
Factually Interrelated Crimes.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, Lee did not provide
an overly broad definition of "common scheme or plan" as used in
section 77-8a-l or misapply controlling Utah case law.
opposite.

Just the

Lee properly recognized that the legislative enactment

was a modification of the previous rule.

Since the legislature

was clearly repealing rule 9, the linguistic differences between
the statute and rule must be presumed intentional.

Madsen v.

Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 1988) (any statutory
amendment not expressly designated as a clarification must be
presumed to be change in existing legal rights and liabilities).
Former rule 9 permitted joinder when the offenses were part of
the same "criminal episode" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1401 (1990) (Addendum A).

Despite the fact that section 76-1-401

remains in effect, Section 77-8a-l disregarded the use and
limitations of "single criminal episode" by utilizing the new
term "common scheme or plan" without reference to any statutory
definition.
Lee defined "common scheme or plan" to include those
crimes which are so factually interconnected that it is
reasonable to assume that their commission arose out of a
calculated plan.

831 P.2d at 117-18.

This is consistent with

the term's usage under the rules of evidence.

Rule 404(b), Utah

Rules of Evidence, permits the admission of other crimes evidence
when it is probative of a defendant's "motive, opportunity,
47

intent, preparation, plan,
mistake or accident'1

knowledge, identity, or absence of

(emphasis added)*

"A common scheme or plan

is said to exist, for evidentiary purposes, if the proof of one
crime tends to prove or establish the other."

State v. Jones,

120 Ariz. 556, 587 P.2d 742, 744 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc).

Accord

State v. Galleqos, 781 P.2d 783, 791 (N.M. App. 1989) (citing 1
C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure; Criminal § 14 3 (2d ed.
1982)).

Under the evidentiary rules, the presumption is that the

other crimes evidence is relevant and competent if probative of a
material fact.

State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17 (Utah

App. 2/12/93).
Here, the trial court was in a unique position in
ruling on the motion for severance.

It had previously heard

extensive live testimony regarding the crimes during the
evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress.

As such, there

is record support for the trial court's determination that the
crimes were factually connected.
As previously discussed (supra at 43), where joinder is
statutorily permissible, denial of a motion to sever may still be
erroneous if the defendant establishes that but for the admission
of the other crimes evidence, there is "a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result."

Velarde, 734 P.2d at 445 n.10. On

the other hand, where the offenses have been misjoinded as a
matter of law, admission of the other crimes evidence will be
presumed prejudicial and reversal mandated unless

the admission

of the evidence is otherwise permissible. Saunders, 699 P.2d at
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741-42; Gotfrev, 598 P.2d at 1238 (Utah 1979).
Here, there was no trial since defendant pled guilty.
Yet, defendant asserts that a jury would have accumulated the
evidence against him and convicted him simply because he was a
"bad man,"

In light of the overwhelming evidence which the State

had of defendant's guilt, this argument is inapposite.
Further (supra at 44), the usual test for prejudice,
i.e., there is a "reasonable likelihood of a different result" if
separate trials had occurred, is analytically inapplicable to a
guilty plea.

Instead, the proper test is whether but for the

denial of the severance motion, defendant would not have pled
guilty and would have proceeded to trial.
U.S. at 59.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474

This is an objective test, made without regard for

the "idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker." .Id. at 5960.

Here, defendant pled guilty only after his motion to

suppress the seized evidence had been denied, Nichols had pled
guilty and testified against Beavers and Beavers had been
convicted.

Under these circumstances, defendant has not

established that the denial of his motion to sever affected his
decision to enter his pleas.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /kf- day of Febiuar.y, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, attorney for
appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this _/_ day of March, 1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-401

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah
1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 227.

C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 203.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «= 152.

76-1-305, Lesser included offense for which period of limitations has run.
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser
offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of the lesser
and included offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall not
be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-1*305, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-305.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 225.

C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 198.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=> 145V2.

PART 4
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE
JEOPARDY
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of
offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of
Section 77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-401; 1975, ch. 47, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77-21-31,

cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For
the present comparable provision, see Rule 9,
R. Crim. P.

11

ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
chant who initiated a customer's arrest for purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect money
owed, even if the money was lawfully owed;
thus section did not shield auto dealer from
liability for false imprisonment where customer drove away in new truck after leaving
check for leas than purchase price dealer was
demanding and dealer called police and asked
that truck be picked up, saying there had been
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury,
Inc., 575 P.2d 688 (Utah 1978).
Probable cause.
—Specific cases.
There was sufficient evidence upon which to
base a jury verdict denying damages for false
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reasonable suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller
v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).

77-7-15

—Standard.
The standard applicable to detentions and
arrests by merchants is composed of both subjective and objective elements; the merchant
must allege and prove not only that he believed in good faith that his conduct was lawful, but also that his belief was reasonable;
even if the crime was not in fact being committed or attempted, if the merchant in good faith
believes that such facts are present as to lead
him to an honest conclusion that a crime is
being committed by the person to be arrested
then he may not be held liable for false arrest;
in determining the reasonableness of the conclusion, the test to be applied is one that is
practical under the circumstances, i.e.,
whether a reasonable and prudent man in his
position would be justified in believing facts
which would warrant making the arrest. Terry
v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment §§ 44 et seq., 66.
C.J.S. — 35 CJ.S. False Imprisonment
§§ 14, 21-25, 40(4)-(7).
A.L.R. — Defamation: actionability of accusation or imputation of shoplifting, 29
A.L.R.3d 961.
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instructions for dealing with shoplifters in action for

false imprisonment or malicious prosecution,
31 A.L.R.3d 705.
Construction and effect in false imprisonment action of statute providing for detention
of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998.
Changing the price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d
1293.
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment •» 2,
10, 13, 15.

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L.
1080, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Balancing test.
Reasonable suspicion test.
—Out-of-state licenses.
—Revoked license.
—Vehicles.
Unreasonable detention.
Balancing test
In traffic violation stops, in balancing the

rights of individuals to be free from arbitrary
interference by law enforcement officers and
the government's interest in crime prevention
and public protection, if a hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the
driver for the cited traffic offense, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the stop is a
pretext, the stop is unconstitutional. State v.
Sierra, 754 T2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES

77-8a-l

77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants.
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the
same indictment or information if each ofifense is a separate count and if the
offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in
their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant
is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor
and felony offenses.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
conduct or in the same criminal episode.
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or
both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is
more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information.
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a
single indictment or information.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate
trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other
relief as justice requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived
if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial.
History: C. 1953, 77-8a-l, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 201, 5 1.
Compiler's Notes. — This section is a recodification of former § 77-35-9, which is Rule
9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. For

notes to cases construing that rule, see the
Court Rules volume.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 201 became effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26.
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Rule 9

What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings — federal
cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622.

Rule 9. Joinder of offenses and of defendants.
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged arise out of
a criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401, U.C.A. 1953. A felony offense and a misdemeanor offense may be charged in the same indictment or
information if:
(1) they arise out of a criminal episode; and
(2) the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to the
misdemeanor along with the felony offense.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct
or in the same criminal episode.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise,
orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to
be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one,
could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure
shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or
information.
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information, or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of
separate counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other
relief as justice requires.
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the
motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by
defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose any
statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence
at the trial.
Cross-References. — Limited admissibility
of evidence, Rule 105, U.R.E.
Multiple prosecutions and double jeopardy,
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405.

Right not to be twice put in jeopardy for
same offense, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12;
f 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Denial of severance.
—Standard of review.
Discretion of trial court
Failure to request severance.
Joinder or severance of defendants.
—Antagonistic defenses.
—Cautionary instructions.

—Specific cases.
—Waiver of objections.
Joinder or severance of offenses.
—In general.
—Specific cases.
—Waiver of objections.
Motions to sever.
—Timeliness.
Cited.
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Rule 403

overruled on other grounds, McFarland v.
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — United States v.
Downing'. Novel Scientific Evidence and the
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839.
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
AX.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of statements made during
test. 47 A.L.R.4th 1202.
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior
misidentification of accused in connection with
commission of crime similar to that presently
charged, 50 A.LJUth 1049.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th
1186.
Thermographic tests: admissibility of test re-

sults in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th
1105.
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143.
Products liability: admissibility of experimental or test evidence to disprove defect in
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125.
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588.
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897.
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927.
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise."
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647
(ND. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Balancing test.
Bias.
Circumstantial evidence.
Credibility of witness.
Cumulative evidence.
Determination of admissibility.
Expert testimony.
Film of murder scene.
Guilty plea.

Impeachment of witness.
Inflammatory evidence.
Offensive remark.
Other offenses.
Photographic evidence.
Prior convictions.
—Impeachment.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Tape recordings.
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Rule 404
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errung exclusion of relevant evidence, did not
depnve defendant of his due process right to a
firor trial State v Fulton, 742 P 2d 1208 (Utah
1987), cert denied, 484 U S 1044, 108 S Ct
777, 98 L Ed 2d 864 (1988)
Cited in State v. Bell 770 PM 100 (Utah
1988), State v McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah
1988), Belden v Dalbo, Inc, 752 P 2d 1317
(Utah Ct App 1988), State v Jamison, 767
P.2d 134 (Utah Ct App 1989), State v
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), State v
Featherson, 781 P 2d 424 (Utah 1989), Ostler
v Albina Transf Co , 781 P.2d 446 (Utah Ct
App 1989), State v Johnson, 784 PJ2d 1135

(Utah 1989), State v Gotschall, 782 P 2d 459
(Utah 1989), State v Cox, 787 P 2d 4 (Utah Ct
App 1990), State v Lopez, 789 P 2d 39 (Utah
Ct App 1990), State v Rocco, 795 P 2d 1116
(Utah 1990), Whitehead v American Motors
Sales Corp , 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), State v
Harrison, 152 Utah Adv Rep 19 (Ct App
1991), State v Pascual, 804 P 2d 553 (Utah Ct
App 1991), State v Taylor, 169 Utah Adv
Rep 62 (Ct App 1991), State v Reed, 172
Utah Adv Rep 31 (Ct App 1991), State v
Hamilton, 174 Utah Adv Rep 7 (1991),
Knight v Ebert, 175 Utah Adv Rep 38 (Ct
App 1991)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Chapman v State
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony — An Issue
of Admissibility or Credibility, 1983 Utah L
Rev 381
United States v Downing- Novel Scientific
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
L Rev 839
Recent Developments m Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1987 Utah L
Rev 137
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child
Abuse Litigation, 1988 Utah L Rev 479
Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting
*Bad Character" Evidence During the Guilt
Phase of Criminal Trials — State v Bishop,
1989 Utah L Rev 1013
State v Rimmasch Utah's Threshold Admissibility Standard for Child Sexual Abuse Profile Evidence, 1990 Utah L Rev 641
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the

Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 81
(1989)
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence
§ 253 et seq
C.J.S — 31A C J S Evidence § 166
AJLR. — Noncharacter witnesses in civil
case, limiting number of, 5 A L R 3d 169
Noncharacter witnesses in criminal case,
limiting number of, 5 A L R 3d 238
Character or reputation witnesses, propriety
and prejudicial effect of trial court's limiting
number of, 17 A L R 3d 327
Evidence offered by defendant at federal
criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403
of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that
probative value is substantially outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
or misleading the jury, 76 A L R Fed 700
Key Numbers. — Evidence «» 143

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except*
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
566
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Rule 404

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule i6
the federal rule, verbatim. Provisions of this
rule apply to character evidence to prove conduct, as distinguished from proof of character
where character i6 an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was
comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d
703 (Utah 1977) (character evidence as to the
character of the victim of a homicide was admissible to rebut the defendant's contention
that the deceased was the aggressor). One significant difference between this rule and Rule
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there
is no provision for the use of character evidence
in civil cases, except where character is the
ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47

authorized the use of character evidence in
civil cases not only on the ultimate issue but
where otherwise substantively relevant. See
Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive
Use, 4 Utah Bar J. 13, 18-19 (1976). However,
Rule 48, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded character evidence with respect to a trait as to care or skill. The Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence
concluded that the remaining justification for
the admission of character evidence was so insignificant that character evidence in civil
cases should not be admitted unless it was in
issue.
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce,
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5
Utah Bar J. 31 (1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Application of rule.
Character of accused.
Character of codefendant.
Common plan or scheme.
Harmless error.
Identity.
Knowledge and intent.
Limiting instruction.
Other crimes.
—Defense.
Proof of motive.
Severance.
Specific instances of conduct.
Victim's character.
Cited.
Application of rule.
Admissibility of evidence of an act that constitutes an early step in the effectuation of the
crime for which defendant is presently charged
and tried is not governed by this rule. State v.
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
Character of accused.
When it becomes apparentfromthe evidence
that the defendant is relying upon the defense
of entrapment, the State must be allowed to
present any evidence in impeachment or rebuttal that would show the defendant's disposition
to commit the crime charged, including prior
acts of crime or misconduct. State v. Hansen,
588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978).
By offering witnesses as to his reputation as
a truthful person, defendant opens the door for
the prosecution to impeach his character wit-

nesses; prosecution may attempt to discredit
the testimony of such witnesses by showing
that they have not heard specific reports that
are relevant to defendant's reputation, but it
cannot present evidence of the truth or falsity
of specific beliefs or reports pertaining to that
reputation. State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah
1981).
While evidence of defendant's criminal character may be, and generally is, excluded under
Subdivision (b) of this rule when such evidence
is elicited or offered by the prosecution to prove
its case-in-chief, the same evidence may be admissible when the responsibility for its introduction may be traced to the defendant. State
v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1984).
Since a defendant's character is not an element of the crime of sexual abuse of a child,
the court does not err in denying the request of
a defendant charged with such crime for admission of past instances of conduct relating to
his deputation for sexual morality." State v.
Mixler, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985).
Character of codefendant
Proffered testimony as to (^defendant's impulsiveness had no bearing on defendant's
guilt or innocence and was not admissible.
State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 1983).
Common plan or scheme.
In prosecution for violation of § 76-6-404,
where it was alleged that defendant had, without authorization, taken a check payable to his
employer which came into his possession in the
course of his employment, endorsed it in the
employer's name, and deposited it to an ac-
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ADDENDUM B

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
RUTH J. McCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by:
Assigned to:

R. McCloskey
R. McCloskey

Plaintiff,
BAIL

(Each Defendant)

v.
A)
B)
C)
D)

$10,000.00

MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS
1/6/66,
ANTHONY HARRIS
12/6/71,
-MICHAEL SEAN NICHOLS 3/26/70,
TERRENCE B. FbEMMfNGS' 6/25/67,

INFORMATION

Criminal No.

?6fr/30/3 ?*

Defendant(s).

The undersigned S. Cheever - SLCPD under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
BURGLARY, a Third Degree Felohy, at 648 East 500 South, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 1990,
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS, ANTHONY IIARRI3, MICHAEL SEAM" NICHOLS
«emd TERRENCE--*-*—FfcEMMIUGS-, asf party** to the offense,
entered or remained unlawfully in the building of Banana
Republic with the intent to commit a theft;

(Continued on page 2)

INFORMATION
STATE V.
A) MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS,
B) ANTHONY HARRIS,
C) MICHAEL SEAN NICHOLS,
D) TERRENCE B. FLEMMINGS,
Page 2

#90
90
90
90

1
1
1
1

81906
81906
81906
81906

COUNT II
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 648 East 500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 1990, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, MICHAEL
DEAN BEAVERS, JbHWiONY^HARRIS,— MICHAEL—C£AN~~tJICHOLS and TSnrtENOE P. FLBMHIMCfi, asApartiWs to the offense, obtained
or exercised unauthorized control over the property of
Banana Republic with the purpose to deprive the owner
thereof, and that the value of said property exceeded
$1,000.00;
COUNT III
BURGLARY, a Third Degree Felony, at 1090 East 7200 South, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 199 0,
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS, ANTHONY HftFPT,?, -Ml^PrFJi-IWiftf-WT^ttnTF*
arrd—TERRENCE—B* ^•FiiEMMINgQ", as A parties to the offense,
entered or remained unlawfully in the building of Mr. Mac
with the intent to commit a theft;
COUNT IV
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 1090 East 7200 South, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 1990,
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS, ANTHONY IIARRI0, MICIIASL SEAN NICHOLS
and TFRRFNCF P
FLFMNIF^F-, as ^parti*? to the offense,
obtained
or exercised unauthorized
control
over the
property of Mr. Mac with the purpose to deprive the owner
thereof, and that the value of said property exceeded
$1,000.00;
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT:
further, that the offenses were committed
in concert with two or more persons in the commission or
furtherance of the offenses, giving rise to enhanced
penalties as provided by Section 76-3-203.1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended;

(Continued on page 3)

INFORMATION
STATE v.
A) MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS,
B) ANTHONY HARRIS,
C) MICHAEL SEAN NICHOLS,
D) TERRENCE B. FLEMMINGS,
Page 3
THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:
Officers:
Others:

#90
90
90
90

1
1
1
1

81906
81906
81906
81906

IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE

FOLLOWING

M. Humphries, T. Berger, S. Cheever, Atkinson, G.
Yoshikawa, Slagowski, L. Kilpack and D. Knudsen.
Lori Billings, David Hunt, Wayne L. Ware and Stan
Christensen.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Affiant, a Detective with Salt Lake City Police Department
bases his information on report, Case No. 90-18176 prepared by Salt
Lake City P.D. Officer Humphries and report, Case No. 123183 prepared
by Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputy Slagowski which indicates that
at above time and place;
1. Defendants all participated in a break in of a business
called Banana Republic by throwing a shopping cart threw a window.
2. Defendants removed 52 canvas coats with a total retail
value of $3,140.00.
3. Defendants later drove to Mr. Mac's, a retail clothing
store and broke in to the business by driving their vehicle into the
front of the store.
4. Defendants removed over 20 leather jackets retail value
of more than $200.00 a piece.
5.
Defendants did not have
business nor to remove the clothing.

permission

to

enter

the

6. Defendants Beavers, Harris, and Nichols all admitted to
affiant as to their involvement with both burglaries.

(Continued on page 4)

ADDENDUM C

1

tighter look under the Utah Constitution than it does the

2

federal constitution.

3

in this particular instance. And even with that higher

4

standard, I am inclined to believe the initial entry into

5

the apartment was reasonable.

6

Still, the same issue was reasonable

Seems to me they gave the officer very certain

7

information.

They have a report of an assault.

Language

8

like, "Don't kill me."

9

some sort of commotion or problem the night before.

They had a report there had been
They

10

see the door and it's broken, happened the night before,

11

happened a few minutes sooner, who knows, but it happened.

12

They hear the voices, sort of an argument going on, and

13

then as the man comes out, he backs up and tries to go back

14

in.

15

officers.

16

going back into the apartment, who knows what he is going

17

to do?

18

some friends, tell the others so they can hole up?

19

don't know if there are weapons involved.

20

To me that is a very dangerous scenario for police
Seems to me just reasonable to see when a man is

Is he going to get a weapon?

Is he going to get
They

It seems to me that's just a very dangerous

21

situation for officers.

22

stop them, even if they have to go in a couple of feet, get

23

them on the floor, subdue them.

24

to do that.

25

It's reasonable at that point to

And what comes next?

I think they had the right

Was it reasonable to go in
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1

further again?

2

another man going into the kitchen. Again, exactly the

3

same very dangerous situation for police officers.

4

going in there to get another weapon?

5

people in there.

6

I have to conclude that it was.

They see

Is he

There are other

Now, they are even in a more dangerous situation

7

because they are in an apartment they don't know about.

8

They don't know where the rooms are. Who's there?

9

they have a right go through the apartment at that point

10

I think

and see if all the people aren't accounted for.

11

Now, if they looked in some drawer or some purses

12

or something small where a person couldn't be hiding, I

13

think that would be unreasonable.

14

room, in closets, under the beds, places where people could

15

hide, I don't think is unreasonable at all.

16

But to look in every

At that point, then, they see the coats in plain

17

view.

They know there's been a burglary in the Banana

18

Republic.

19

hanger.

20

suspicious thing, and it seems to me that gave rise to the

21

search warrant.

22

destroying evidence, or anything to do with evidence, or

23

anything to do with a burglary, or information about a

24

burglary, or whether the coats were leather or cloth, or

25

anything like that until that point.

Nobody has a whole bunch of brand new coats on a

The Banana Republic labels, that is a very

I don't think there was a question of

I don't think the

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

1

officers were trying to solve a burglary; they were trying

2

to investigate an assault and they were trying to protect

3

themselves, and I think they did so reasonably.

4

Then they saw that they had probable cause to

5

secure the area, to question the witnesses and get a

6

warrant, and that's what they did, so I don't think

7

anything they seized there needs to be suppressed.

8

think they violated any Fourth Amendment rights at the

9

apartment•

10

I don't

Then the question seems to focus on the house.

11

At the house they see Beavers through the window.

12

me they could have just watched all the doors and not let

13

him out and got a warrant. And I think it was an improper

14

thing to do.

15

from that?

16

arrest him, they take him out, they shouldn't have done

17

that.

18

Seems to

They are within the house.

Then what flows

So far as I can see, nothing.

Because they

Okay.
But then they ask the owner of the place, the

19

renter, the primary occupant, "Can we look in his room?"

20

Now, he only lived there for five days.

21

house. Apparently, he has standing.

22

about that.

23

the place, but it's her place as well,

24

rented it from her, had the right to exclude her from it.

25

I don't think there is any evidence he had the right to

It's really her

I have no question

He has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
it's not like he
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1

exclude her from it.

2

There were only some other clothes in there,

3

children's clothes, things that weren't his, all kinds of

4

clothes, as I recall the testimony.

5

is that he did have a right of privacy in there.

6

right to exclude her, and she had the right to make a

7

consent, and she consented.

8

I don't find her consent statement to be hearsay.

9

that it was not hearsay.

I think the evidence
He had no

I think the evidence is clear
I think

She said she consents.

10

They searched that apartment, that room, with her

11

consent and, therefore, there is nothing to suppress there.

12

I think that supersedes the problem with the warrantless

13

arrest.

14

they had got a warrant and I think the consent does away

15

with any problem in searching that room.

16

They would have searched that room anyway, even if

They take him into the car and they ask him about

17

the coats. He said they were in the car, no Miranda

18

warning.

19

That's a violation of Miranda, I have no doubt of that.

20

And his statement will be excluded under Miranda.

21

don't think that makes the search of the automobile

22

unlawful, because the evidence is that they were wondering

23

whether the coats were in the automobile anyway.

24

been told they were in the automobile and they asked the

25

owner of the automobile if they could search her car, and

That's a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

But I

They had
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1

she said yes, and she gave her consent.

2

reason why that should be suppressed.

3

So I don't see any

So what it boils down to, it seems to me, in the

4

end, the only single thing in this whole hearing that

5

really needs to be suppressed is that one single statement

6

he made in the car without being given Miranda warnings,

7

and the rest is all reasonable under both the Fourth

8

Amendment and the state constitution, for the most part.

9

Nith that small exception, the motion to suppress is

10

denied.

I will ask Ms. McCloskey to prepare Findings of

11

Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with the statement I

12

just made.

13

MS. McCLOSKEY:

14

MR. MOFFAT:

15

MR. SCOWCROFT:

16

THE COURT:

17

Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you.

Court will be in recess.

(Hearing coneluded.)

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3
4

STATE OF UTAH

)
t

5

SALT LAKE COUNTY

SB.

)

6
7
8
9

I, NORA S. WORTHEN, an official court reporter
for the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake

10

County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that I reported

11

stenographically the proceedings in the matter of State of

12

Utah versus Michael Dean Beavers, and Anthony Harris,

13

Case No. 901901946, 901901947, respectively, and that the

14

above and foregoing is a true and correct transcript of

15

said proceedings.

16
17

Dated this 23rd day of March 1992.

18
19
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ADDENDUM D

Ti'tifc! JLa*CiE» District

MAY 1 4 1991

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT1"
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CASE NO.

vs.

:

MICHEAL DEAN BEAVERS,
ANTHONY HARRIS,

901901946 FS
901901947

:

Defendants.

On April 1, 1991, the Court heard evidence pursuant to
defendants' Motion to Suppress.

Defendants allege that the

warrantless entry into Apartment 4B at 837 East 700 South, and
a residence located at 1334 South 1000 East were improper and
unreasonable under both the Federal and State Constitutions.
On April 16, 1991, the Court heard arguments from counsel and,
based on the evidence in said arguments, made the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November

12, 1990, at

approximately

9:51

a.m.,

police officers arrived at the address of 837 East 700 South,

STATE V. BEAVERS

PAGE TWO

Apartment 4B, on an assault call.

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Radio dispatches included

information to the effect that someone said "don't kill me.11
2.

Upon arrival at the apartment building, officers met

with Mr. Hunt, the apartment manager, who directed the officers
to apartment 4B.
3.

Upon

arrival

at

apartment

4B,

officers

found

a

recently damaged door, and heard an argument coming from inside
the apartment.

The officers listened at the door briefly, and

could hear an argument inside the apartment about a coat.

The

officers did not knock on the door, or notify the occupants of
their presence at the door.
4.

A person who came out of the apartment carrying a

coat, was later identified as Dexter Davis.

As soon as he

detected the officers' presence, he tried to retreat into the
apartment.

Officer

Humphries

reached

into

the

apartment,

grabbed Dexter Davis, and pulled him to the ground.
5.

At the same instant that Dexter Davis was taken to the

ground, Officer Humphries could see into the apartment, and
observed an individual quickly move into the kitchen out of the
line of sight.
6.

The police then went into the apartment and detained

the individuals who were present.

STATE V. BEAVERS

7.

PAGE THREE

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Officer Humphries then walked through the apartment

searching for other individuals.

He searched under the bed,

and in closets, and other places where persons could be hiding,
but did not search in smaller areas.
8.

While looking through the apartment for individuals,

Officer Humphries observed a large number of new coats hanging
in closets.

These were

in plain

sight and

could

be seen

without opening doors or moving contents.
9.
scene,

Prior to the time that the officers had arrived at the
they

were

aware

of

a burglary

of

coats

at

Banana

Republic.
10.

Following

Humphries,

Foster

the

observation

and

Beger

of

secured

the

coats,

apartment

4B

Officers
and

its

contents, and summoned Detectives Cheever and Yoshikawa to the
scene.
11.

Officer Yoshikawa

then left the scene to obtain a

search warrant.
12.

Detective Cheever was told by people at the scene that

defendant Beavers had gone to a house on 10th East.
13.
Upon

Sergeant Brown then went to the house on 10th East.

arriving,

he

could

see defendant

Beavers

through

window and could have waited for an arrest warrant.
he went into the home to arrest defendant Beavers.

the

Instead,

STATE V. BEAVERS

14.

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

PAGE FOUR

In the meantime, Detective Yoshikawa obtained a search

warrant and searched apartment 4B.
15.

After Beavers was arrested, Karren Buzzard, the owner

of the home, consented to allow Sergeant Atkinson to search the
room where Mr. Beavers was staying.

Beavers had been staying

there a day or two, and in addition to items belonging to Ms.
Buzzard,

the

room

contained

many

other

items,

including

children's stuffed animals.
16.

Sergeant Atkinson seized several coats from the room

where Beavers was staying.
17.

Mr. Beavers did not have the right to exclude the

homeowner from the room, in that he was not a paying tenant and
items belonging to the homeowner were within the room.
18.

While Mr. Beavers was in custody, and without advising

him of his rights, Sergeant Atkinson asked him if the coats
were

still

in the car, to which Beavers responded

in the

affirmative.
19.

Sergeant

Atkinson

previously

stolen coats were in the car.

had

information

that

This information was obtained

from the persons at apartment 4B.
20.

The owner of the car gave her consent to Sergeant

Atkinson to search the car.
21.

Several coats were found in the car.

STATE V. BEAVERS
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The initial entry in apartment

4B at 837 East 700

South was a reasonable search and seizure under both the 14th
Amendment

of the United States Constitution, and Article I,

Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and no evidence is to be
excluded as a result of said entry.

The initial detention of

Dexter Davis was reasonable in light of the fact that Davis may
have had a weapon, may have been retreating into the apartment
to secure a weapon, or the like.

His detention was necessary

as a safety measure for the police officers.
2.

The

further

intrusion

into

the

apartment

was

also

reasonable and not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, nor Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution, in that this was also required by the
officer's safety.

The person retreating into the kitchen and

out of the line of sight could have been trying to get a weapon
or take an offensive position.

It was

reasonable

for the

officers' safety at this time that they apprehend the person
who went into the kitchen and look through the apartment for
other individuals who may have weapons.

STATE V. BEAVERS

3.

Because

PAGE SIX

the

officers

had

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

a

right

to

be

in

the

apartment to look for other individuals, the coats, seen in
plain sight, were not found as a result of an unreasonable
search.
4.

The coats, with new labels, in light of the officers'

knowledge of a burglary at Banana Republic, provided sufficient
information to form probable cause, secure the apartment, and
seek a search warrant.

Therefore, the coats and other evidence

taken at the scene pursuant to the search warrant will not be
suppressed.
5.
Beavers

Although the entry to effect the arrest of Michael
into

the

home

at

1334

South

1000

East

was

not

reasonable under either the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution, nor the Utah Constitution, no evidence directly
flowed

from

said

entry

and

subsequent

arrest,

so

none

is

suppressed.
6.

The coats found in the room at the home on 1334 South

1000 East were found as a result of a consensual search.

The

consent was given by a person having a right to entry to the
room, and will not be suppressed.
7.

The statement made by Mr. Beavers regarding the coats

in the car will be suppressed as a violation of his rights
under the Miranda decision.
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8.

PAGE SEVEN

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

The coats found in the trunk of the car will not be

suppressed

as

evidence

due

to

the

fact

that

police

had

information from other sources that the coats were in the car,
and the owner of the car gave her consent to the search.
Dated this

I H day of May, 1991.

SCOTTMNIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
to the following, this

(A, dav of May, 1991:

Ruth J. McCloskey
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roger K. Skowcroft
Mark A. Moffat
Attorneys for Defendants
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

*4l/^s

Third JuG;o?ai District

JUN

6 1991

By.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT"
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS
OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

vs.
MICHEAL DEAN BEAVERS,
ANTHONY HARRIS,

901901946 FS
901901947 FS

Defendants.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the
Court on May 14, 1991 are amended as follows:
1.

Paragraph 13 is amended to read as follows:

Atkinson then went to the house on 10th East.

Sergeant

Upon arriving,

he could see defendant Beavers through the window, and could
have awaited for an arrest warrant.

Instead he went into the

home to arrest defendant Beavers.
Dated this

_day of June, 1991.

. \ ( d p ^ O i , >(2i
SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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SEP

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RUTH J. MCCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

5 1991
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

MICHAEL D. BEAVERS &
ANTHONY HARRIS
Defendants.

)

Case No. 901901946FS
& 901901947FS
Honorable Scott Daniels

)

On August 30, 1991, the Court heard arguments from counsel
regarding the severance of the defendants from one another, the
severance of Counts I and II from Counts III and IV for each
defendant, and Count V from the other counts for defendant Beavers.
Due to the substantial

intertwining of the evidence in

this case, it was determined by the Court that the defendants would
not be unduly prejudiced by having a single trial on Counts I, II,
III, IV, for each defendant.

Count V, however, should be severed

and remanded to the Circuit Court for trial.
Based upon agreement by the State, defendant Beavers and

ORDER
Case No's 901901946FS
& 901901947FS
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defendant Harris will be tried separately.
DATED this

3

day of September, 1991
BY THE COURT:

UJ&h
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
Third District Court Judge
RMc/sc/0431

1

the state of mind of the officers.

2

THE COURT: Well, I think I understand your

3

position.

4

you have briefed—not briefed, exactly—provided me with

5

the opinions and the law and laid it out very well. And I

6

do agree with you, Ms. McCloskey, the facts are pretty well

7

on the table.

8

I can rule as a result.

9

I appreciate it.

They are necessary with what

I think that it's all there and I think that

Okay.

The first issue is, was the initial

10

intrusion into the apartment reasonable within the meaning

11

of the Utah State Constitution and the federal

12

constitution.

13

agree with Mr. Moffat's argument that the Utah State

14

Constitution is, in many instances, broader than the

15

protection of the federal constitution.

16

constitution, both in the early history of the people who

17

came before they got here and also the prosecutions that

18

were conducted in the early part of our history, would

19

indicate to me that they were more concerned about

20

protecting individual rights than others may have been.

21

And our founding fathers indicated that we should have

22

broader protections.

23

I might just say, for the record, that 1

The history of our

Nevertheless, in questions of search and seizure,

24

the question still comes down to reasonableness.

Maybe, as

25

Mr. Moffat said, what's reasonable may take a little
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1

tighter look under the Utah Constitution than it does the

2

federal constitution.

3

in this particular instance. And even with that higher

4

standard, I am inclined to believe the initial entry into

5

the apartment was reasonable.

6

Still, the same issue was reasonable

Seexas to me they gave the officer very certain

7

information.

They have a report of an assault.

Language

8

like, "Don't kill me."

9

some sort of commotion or problem the night before.

They had a report there had been
They

10

see the door and it's broken, happened the night before,

11

happened a few minutes sooner, who knows, but it happened.

12

They hear the voices, sort of an argument going on, and

13

then as the man comes out, he backs up and tries to go back

14

in.

15

officers.

16

going back into the apartment, who knows what he is going

17

to do?

18

some friends, tell the others so they can hole up?

19

don't know if there are weapons involved.

20

To me that is a very dangerous scenario for police
Seems to me just reasonable to see when a man is

Is he going to get a weapon?

Is he going to get
They

It seems to me that's just a very dangerous

21

situation for officers.

22

stop them, even if they have to go in a couple of feet, get

23

them on the floor, subdue them.

24

to do that.

25

It's reasonable at that point to

And what comes next?

I think they had the right

Was it reasonable to go in
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1

exclude her from it.

2

There were only some other clothes in there,

3

children's clothes, things that weren't his, all kinds of

4

clothes, as I recall the testimony.

5

is that he did have a right of privacy in there.

6

right to exclude her, And she had the right to make a

7

consent, and she consented.

8

I don't find her consent statement to be hearsay.

9

that it was not hearsay.

I think the evidence
He had no

I think the evidence is clear
I think

She said she consents.

10

They searched that apartment, that room, with her

11

consent and, therefore, there is nothing to suppress there.

12

I think that supersedes the problem with the warrantless

13

arrest.

14

they had got a warrant and I think the consent does away

15

with any problem in searching that room.

16

They would have searched that room anyway, even if

They take him into the car and they ask him about

17

the coats. He said they were in the car, no Miranda

18

warning.

19

That's a violation of Miranda, I have no doubt of that.

20

And his statement will be excluded under Miranda.

21

don't think that makes the search of the automobile

22

unlawful, because the evidence is that they were wondering

23

whether the coats were in the automobile anyway.

24

been told they were in the automobile and they asked the

25

owner of the automobile if they could search her car, and

That's a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

But I

They had
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ADDENDUM F

UTAH EXCLUSIONARY RULE
e. The history of Mormon polygamy prosecutions does not provide a basis for
interpreting article I, section 14
Sometimes it is argued that the history of polygamy prosecutions of some
Mormons means that the framers of the Utah Constitution intended to adopt
stronger protections against abusive police practices than other states, protections
that are embodied in article I, section 14.327 To date Kenneth Wallentine has
provided the most detailed exposition of this argument for an expansive
interpretation of article I, section 14. One can gain the flavor of his thesis in the
following excerpt:
As part of the anti-polygamy enforcement, the fourth amendment was
often discarded and ignored by U.S. marshals, other law enforcement officers
and courts. Early accounts tell of federal marshals who saw little need for the
aid of search warrants....
Against this history of unprecedented federal, judicial abuse, arises a
theory that the search and seizure provision in the Utah Constitution was
included as a deliberate, considered act, rather than part of a wholesale
importation of constitutional language.. . .
Drafters of Utah's early constitutions were intimately familiar with
egregious searches of the sort unknown since the days of King George. Reason
dictates that the drafters were acutely concerned with providing protection and
remedies against unlawful searches and seizures.828
The difficulties with this argument are numerous: First, the argument
places too much weight on an unexpressed, subjective intention of the framers of
the Utah Constitution. Second, the framers of the constitution adopted specific
rights responsive to the freedom of religion concerns raised by the polygamy
prosecutions. It is these provisions - not article I, section 14 - that were
designed to deal with abusive practices. Third, a careful reading of the historical

from recalling historical tragedies only by pleading that they shall not happen again"). I am suggesting only
that Justice for criminal wrongdoers is a strong tradition in the state. Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere,
the best way to avoid "self-help" measures may be to insure that a state's criminal law actually imposes just
punishment on convicted criminals. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent:
A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121,157 (1988).
327.. Set, *£., BriefforAppellant Greg Hewitt at 22, State v. Hewitt, No. 910335-CA (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
328. Wallentine, supra note 226, at 276-79 (citations omitted). For an excellent description of the polygamy prosecutions, see EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLUN MANGRUM, ZlON IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900 125-260 (1988).
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documents suggests that theframers'primary experience was with harsh federal
prosecutions rather than abuse at the hands of their own, locally-controlled police
forces. Finally, there are competing traditions among the Mormon settlers
bearing more directly on the exclusionary rule issue that squarely cut against the
rule.
One must approach with caution an interpretive approach that singles out
a particular religious segment of Utah society and interprets the Utah
Constitution consistently with its views. The Utah Constitution was a product
of cooperation among different religious traditions. Both Mormons and Gentiles
alike drafted its provisions.329 If one gives dispositive weight to the views of the
Mormon delegates in determining the intent of the Utah Constitutional
Convention, how does one handle the opinions of Charles S. Varian, who
apparently voted for article I, section 14? Varian aggressively prosecuted many
polygamists,330 but was far and away the most active (and perhaps the most
influential) of all of the delegates.331
Moreover, several provisions in the Utah Constitution respond directly to the
problems raised by the history of the polygamy prosecutions. While also
specifically outlawing polygamy, Article EI of the Constitution provides directly
that M[n]o inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or property
on accoimt of his or her mode of religious worship . . . .*332 Article I, section 1
affirms the "inherent and inalienable right" of all persons"to worship according
to the dictates of their consciences . ..." Article I, section 4 guarantees that
"[t]he rights of conscience shall never be infringed" and that M[t]he State shall
make no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Responding specifically
to the federal practice of disqualifying Mormons from juries in polygamy
trials,333 that section also provided "nor shall any person be incompetent as a
witness or juror on accoimt of religious belief or the absence thereof." In answer
to the federal practice of forcing polygamist wives to testify against their

329. Stanley S. Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 UTAH HIST. Q. 96,100 (1957) ("in line with the new
political truce [between Utah Mormons and Gentiles], there were 28 non-Mormon delegates" of 107 delegates
to the convention).
330. Id. at 100; see DESERET NEWS, Jan. 27,1886, at 27 (describing prosecution by Varian).
831. Ivins, tupra note 329, at 113-14; see also Another Busy Day, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 5, 1895, at 5.
832. WaTfentine describes this provision as "unique*1 among the states "insofar as it proscribes
disturbance of person or property." Wallentine, supra note 226, at 280.
333. See FlRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 328, at 161, 165-66, 227-31.
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husbands,834 article I, section 12 enshrined a constitutional marital testimonial
privilege: W[A] wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife . . . . " Article III directs that "[p]erfect toleration of
religious sentiment is guaranteed." Given these provisions, one hardly needs to
pour concern about abusive polygamy prosecutions into the vessel of article I,
section 14. The framers knew how to speak directly about the problems they had
seen, and did so in these specific constitutional stipulations.335
In addition, a careful reading of the historical record reveals that the
Mormons were particularly disturbed by federal criminal prosecutions. The
federal judicial machinery was responsible for enforcing anti-polygamy statutes
and drew the ire of many of the citizens of Utah.336 Apart from the peculiar
context of these religiously-influenced prosecutions dictated by politicians in
Washington, D.C., nothing suggests that the framers of the Utah Constitution both Mormon and non-Mormon - intended to adopt provisions that would
increase the burdens on their own state criminal justice system. The drafters of
the Utah Constitution knew that with Utah's entry into the Union, the state's
citizens would assume responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the
criminal justice system and would soon need to prosecute crimes effectively.
This sentiment is expressed, for instance, in a petition signed by 22,626
women of Utah and sent to Congress in 1876:
We ask to be relievedfromthe unjust and law-breaking officials forced
upon us by the Government, and that we may have the jurisdiction of our own
courts and the selection of our own officers, as we had in the past, when our
cities werefreefromdram-shops, gambling-dens, and houses of infamy. As
mothers and sisters, we earnestly appeal to you for help, that our sons may
be savedfromdrunkenness and vice and our daughtersfromthe power of the
seducer . . . .S37
Citizens concerned about ridding their cities of "dram-shops, gambling-dens, and
houses of infamy" were not likely to make prosecution of those crimes more
difficult.338

334. Id. at 130, 138, 149-50, 163, 167, 194-97, 206-09.
835. The delegates to the convention also were apparently aware of expansive protections of privacy in
other state'constitutions but did not incorporate them into Utah's Constitution. See supra note 268 and
accompanying text (discussing Washington protection of privacy).
836. See FRMAGE & MANGKUM, supra note 328, at 147-48.
337. A Petition of 22,626 Women of Utah, H i t Misc. Doc. No. 42 at 1-2, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876).
838. See also Epistle of the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, in
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